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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF' FACTS 
Contrary to appellants' representation that they 
own the fee title to Lot 8, Block 1 North, Beyles River-
side Plot, they own fee title to an undivided one-half 
interest only. 
The Warranty Deed at p. 78 of the Abstract to 
the property (Ex. P. 5) dated Sept. 15, 1930, conveys 
1 
Lot 8 to A. V. and Patricia G. Raplee as tenants in 1 
common. The affidavit of Patricia G. Raplee at R. 35. 
discloses that A. V. Raplee is deceased. There is no 
evidence whether he left a will or who his heirs are. 
Appellants' claim to title to Lot 8 consists of a deed 
they acquired for $50.00 from Patricia G. Rap lee dated 
May 3, 1965, recorded May 6, 1965 (Ex. P-3) and 
a deed they acquired for $50.00 dated May 10, 1965, · 
recorded May 12, 1965 (Ex. P-4) from Robert G. 
Raplee, who describes himself as the only child of 
1 
Patricia G. Raplee and the late A. V. Raplee. The : 
record is also silent as to how many times A. V. Raplee I 
was married or what children he may have had from r 
i 
other wives. Appellants failed to prove that they ac- ' 
quired the undivided one-half interest of A. V. Raplee ) 
to Lot 8 as a tenant in common. ' 
Respondents claim ownership thru Ex. D-1, 
Auditor's Tax Deed, dated Feb. 28, 1939, conveying 
1 
Lot 8 to Salt Lake County upon failure of owners tc 
redeem Lot 8 for four years after the tax sale made i 
Jan. 10, 1935 for unpaid 1934 taxes, together with I 
Ex. D-2, Salt Lake County Deed to respondents dated i 
June 15, 1965, of Lot 8, for $400.00 tendered to Salt 
Lake County on April 28, 1965, (T-107 and Ex. , 
D-10) with respondents' offer to purchase Lot 8 from 
the County. 
Mrs. Raplee's affidavit dated June 2, 1966 (R-35) 
was received in evidence per Stipulation of the parties 
shown at R. 45. Mrs. Raplee's affidavit states: 
2 
"3. That neither my deceased husband during 
his life, nor I during my lifetime, or anyone act-
ing for us or on our behalf, ever went upon the 
aforesaid real property (Lot 8) or took posses-
sion or occupancy of it from and after the time 
we purchased it from W. R. Roberts and Lulu 
Roberts, his wife, on Sept. 15, 1930. 
4. Neither of us . . . paid any of the taxes 
... except for the first few years. So far as my 
deceased husband and I were concerned, we 
abandoned the property more than 30 years ago." 
On May 12, 1965, after appellants had recorded 
the last of the two deeds received from Mrs. Raplee and 
her son, and until they filed this action on June 1, 1965, 
appellants went to Lot 8, looked at it and measured 
it with a tape. They went back to the property a second 
time to see if there were any trucks parked on it. (T-71, 
72). ]/fr. Layton testified (T. 92) that appellant claimed 
no right or interest in Lot 8 prior to May 12, 1965. 
Thereafter and up to the time of the filing of this action, 
Mr. Layton admitted he didn't occupy the land. 'Ve 
quote from T -93: 
Q. And other than what you did the first time 
vou went down, you did nothing between May 
i2, '55 and June 1, '65, except file your suit 
in this matter. 'Vould that be a correct statement 
of fact? 
A. As far as occupying the land? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, I didn't occupy the land. 
3 
The court found that the appellants and their 
predecessors failed to actually occupy or be in possession 
of the property for mo~e than 30 years last past, which 
30 years encompasses the four years prior to the com-
mencement of their action, and appellants were there-
fore found barred under the provisions of Sections 
78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3 and 78-12-7.1, UCA 1953 
as amended (R. 52, 53). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. Appellants' action is barred by the statute of 
limitations, 78-12-5.l and 78-12-5.2. 
2. Appellants' action is barred by the adverse pos-
session statute 78-12-7.l. 
3. Respondents have proved title and are entitled 
to the decree which quieted their title against appellants. \ 
I 
ARGUMENT 
RESPONDENTS HA VE A TAX TITLE 
VALID AGAINST APPELLANTS' TITLE. 
Salt Lake County acquired a tax title by Auditor's 
Tax Deed dated Feb. 28, 1939 (D-1) and respondents 
succeeded to it by Salt Lake County Deed dated 
June 15, 1965, (D-2) pursuant to a $400.00 tender and 
offer to purchase submitted to Salt Lake County April 
28, 1965, (T-107), which offer was accepted at the Salt 
Lake County Commission meeting June 4, 1905. (T· 
108). Appellants owned Lots l thru 6. Respondents 
4 
outbid them and acquired Lot 7 in early April, 1965 
at a probate sale, offered to purchase Lot 8 from the 
County on April 28, 1965, and acquired Lot 9 from 
dealings with a private party which culminated on l\Iay 
11, 1965. Respondents, after acquiring Lot 7 and prior 
to .May 1, 1965, had Lots 7, 8 and 9 surveyed and 
marker pegs installed prior to June 1, 1965, ( T-111), 
which pegs were visible to appellants when they went 
upon the property after :May 12, 1965 ( T-'73). Re-
spondents contend appellants had not advised them 
of their interest in or purchase of Lot 8 at any time 
prior to respondents' purchase of it on June 4, 1965, 
or they wouldn't have thrown away their $400.00 ( T-
112, 113, 114, 115). 
Appellants contend that the tax title is invalid in 
that the 1934 assessment roll contained no Auditor's 
Affidavit attached to it as required by Section 58-8-7 
UCA 1953. However, Section 78-12-5.3 UCA 1953 
defines "tax title" in such a way as to render immaterial 
the technical defects in tax sales that have heretofore 
voided the validity of tax titles, whereby respondents' 
tax title, even if invalid, is perfected if the owners 
are barred from maintaining an action against the tax 
title by virtue of the statutes of limitation, Sections 
78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, UCA 1953 as amended. So 
this Court decided in Hansen v. Morris, 3 Ut.2d 310, 
283 P2 884. 
Appellants cite Thomas v. Braffets Heirs, 6 Utah 
2d 57, 305 P2 507, as authority that the missing Audi-
5 
tor's Affidavit renders the instant tax title void. How-
ever, that case is not in point, as the Court there held 
that the defense of the owners of the land was not 
barred by the statutes of limitation aforesaid and the 
owners could therefore properly raise the invalidity 
of the tax title in their defense to it. 
Introduction of the tax title, D-1, was sufficient 
under Section 78-12-5.3 UCA 1953 as amended to show 
prima facie valid tax title in respondents. See Hansen 
v. Morris supra. 
Appellants cite Lyman v. Natl. Mtge. Bond Corp., 
7 Utah 2d 123, 320 P2 322, that the tax title should 
fail even where the owners have not been in possession 
or occupancy. The court there held in favor of the 
owners because the tax owner had failed to pay all the 
taxes levied or assessed upon the property within four ' 
years prior to the commencent of the action. The Court 
held that the tax title owners had failed to establish 
any valid claim to the property because the adverse 
possession statute, 78-12-7.1 UCA 1953 barred them, 
under the last three lines thereof, because of their failure 
to pay all taxes on time for the required period of years 
therein set forth. 
The instant case is not covered by the Lyman 
decision, for in this case, all taxes levied or assessed upon 
the property since the inception of the tax title in 1939 
have been timely met. Further, respondents can preyail 
over appellants on the theory of adverse possessors, 
even if appellants were not barred by the statutes of 
6 
limitation, as respondents meet the remaining require-
ments of 78-12-7.l to qualify as adverse possessors 
under a tax title. Appellants in their brief attempt to 
show that the Raplees had the constructive possession 
of the land because they were the legal owners and that 
the County did not become the owner in 1939 because 
of the alleged defect of the missing Auditor's affidavit 
on the assessment roll. 
However, the presumption that the legal owner 
of the title is in possession of the land, cited in the 
general law and cases in pp. 15-18 of appellant's brief, 
is only a prima facie presumption. It falls in the face 
of the rebutting evidence presented by Mrs. Raplee's 
affidavit (R-35) in which she states that not only did 
they never take possession or go into any occupancy 
of the land - they had abandoned the property more 
than 30 years ago. Abandonment is inconsistent with 
possession or any constructive possession, and the pre-
sumption fails. Section 78-12-5.l states that no action 
or defense shall be commenced or interposed more than 
four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance 
or transfer creating such tax title unless the person com-
mencing or interposing such action or defense or his 
predecessor has act1ially occupied or been in possession 
of such property within four years prior to the com-
mencement of the action. Section 78-12-5.2 uses the 
hnguage, " ... has actually occ1ipied or been in actual 
possession, ... " 'Vhen l\-1rs. Raplee states on :May 3, 
HH.l5, that the legal owners abandoned the property 
7 
more than 30 years ago, or prior to May 3, 1935, how 
can appellants now contend that they, thru their 
( Raplee) predecessors, had constructive or any kind 
of possession? The prima facie presumption that the 
County, as legal owner since 1939 under the tax title, 
was in possession, remained unrebutted. The court 
found that appellants' acts between May 12 and June 
1, 1965, did not constitute actually occupying or being 
in possession of the property. Furthermore, the dictum 
in Peterson v. Callister, 6 Ut. 2d 359, 313 P2d 814, 
indicates that appellants' efforts, even if successful, 
would have been a couple of decades too late. 
The dictum in Peterson v. Callister, supra, antici· 
pates, analyzes and capsules this case exactly as it was 
decided in the lower court, based on the court's inter· 
pretation of Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, which : 
are substantially similar and are our statutes of limi, 1 
tation concern tax titles. 
78-12-5.1 says 
" ... with respect to actions or defenses ... 
against the holder of a tax title ... no such action 
or defense shall be commenced or interposed more 
than four years after the date of the tax deed 
... unless the person commencing or interposing 
such action or defense ... has actually occupied 
or been in possession ... within four years prior 
to the commencement or interposition of such 
action or defense . " (Italics ours) . 
78-12-5.2 says: 
"No action or defense ... shall be commenced 
8 
or interposed against the holder of a tax title 
after the expiration of four years from the date 
of the ... tax title. This section shall not bar any 
action or defense by the owner of the legal title 
... where he ... has actually occupied ... such 
property within four years from the commence-
ment or interposition of such action or defense." 
Both statutes interdict commencement of action 
or interposition of defense more than four years after 
the date of the tax title. Both statutes clearly state this. 
They then go on to identify who is permitted to com-
mence such an action or interpose such a defense ( dur-
ing such four year period) as being a person who was 
in actual possession of the property within four years 
prior to such action or defense. Both statutes define 
and limit such action to an action (or defense) com-
menced or interposed within four years after the date 
of the tax title. 
In other words, if the tax title arose Jan. 1, 1960, 
suit is required to be commenced or defense interposed, 
within four year thereafter, or prior to Jan. 1, 1964, 
and then only by a person who was in actual possession 
within four years prior to not later than Jan. l, 1964, 
the last date on which such suit could commence or 
defense be interposed. 
Peterson v. Callister, supra, clearly so states. It 
says that a person cannot defeat the tax title by showing 
that he was in possession within four years prior to the 
commencement of any action that might be brought, 
as appellants insist in the instant case. Appellants 
9 
wish this court to rely on the last half of the above two 
statutes and ignore the first half. The first half is a 
limitation on the last half of each statute and require~ 
appellants to be in possession of the land within four 
years prior to the commencement of an action which 
had to be commenced or def ended within four years 
after the tax title arose. The Court so held in Hansen 
v. Morris, supra. 
As stated in Peterson v. Callister! 
"To read the last part of the statute literally 
and not in context with the entire statute would 
defeat the purpose of the statue, which is to put 
tax titles to rest after four years; that if a tax 
title holder brought a quiet title action 25 years 
after he acquired his tax title, someone in pos· 
session within four years of the commencement 
of this action could defeat the tax title holder, 1 
and that is not the intention or purport of the 1 
statutes in question." 
The implications in Pender v. Alix, 11 U2 58, 
354 P2 1066, support the foregoing reasoning. 
Brown acquired a tax deed from Salt Lake County 
in Sept., 1942. Pender brought a quiet title suit in 
1947 and joined Salt Lake County as defendant but 
not Brown. Brown learned of the action and joined in 
1959 as intervenor, asserting his tax title and continu· 
ous occupancy and payment of taxes since 1942. The 
court granted Brown's motion for summary judgment, 
and Pender appealed. In affirming the summary ju<lg· 


















payment of taxes or occupancy during or after the four 
years ensuing after Brown obtained the tax deed. 
If there could be an implication that the court 
might have ruled otherwise if Pender had proved occu-
pancy "after the four years ensuing after Brown ob-
tained the tax deed", such implication is squarely against 
the language in the Peterson vs. Callister case, which 
the Supreme Court expressly cited and reaffirmed in 
the Pender case. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we repeat that this case has been 
resolved in favor of respondents by the dictum in Peter-
son v. Callister, which analyzed the statutes of limi-
tation aforesaid as they applied to a hypothetical 
case which is on all fours with the instant case. Here, 
26 years after the initiation of the tax title, appellants 
acquired a portion of the outstanding legal title, where 
the legal owners had admittedly abandoned the prop-
erty even before the initiation of the tax title, and 
appellants then by a brief, cursory and unsuccessful 
effort attempted to put themselves into "actual occu-
pancy and possession" to oust the tax title claimants. 
This is inimical to the intent and purpose of our limi-
tations statutes and such efforts should, as in the past, 
fail. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
MARY C. LEHMER 
Attorney for Respondents 
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